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RECENT DECISIONS

WILLs--MERGER OF ANNUITY FOR LIFE IN RESIDUE WHICH PASSED
BY INTESTACY-Testator made several pecuniary bequests, including an annuity to his daughter of $25 per month for life. The residue was bequeathed to
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charity, but this gift failed, and it went instead, by intestacy, to the daughter and
a granddaughter. The latter, objecting to a plan of distribution proposed by the
auditor, petitioned for immediate payment to herself of one-half of the entire
estate, contending that the daughter's annuity merged in her intestate share.
The Orphans' Court dismissed the petition, and decreed that $12,831.44 of the
estate of $32,831.44 be retained to carry out the testator's delayed bequests,
including the annuity, and that the balance of $20,000 be paid to the two distributees in equal shares. On appeal, held, affirmed. In re Y eisley's Estate, (Pa.
1948) 56 A. (2d) 205.
The opinion refers to no cases relied on by plaintiff, and it is difficult to
see what her theory was. The court reasoned that the intestacy was only as
to residue, and residue is that which is left after all specified gifts have been
paid. Therefore, the daughter was entitled to receive the annuity plus an intestate share of what was left. Undoubtedly the court is on solid ground thus
far. Testator did not contemplate that either of these people would share in
the residue of his estate, and there could thus be no justification for preferring
one over the other, either by charging the entire annuity against the plaintiff's
share, or by holding it entirely extinguished. But the court is not supported by
the cases in its further statement that there could be no merger because "where
interests have been held to merge, the beneficiary possessed a life estate in the
whole and also a vested interest in remainder." 1 There is ample authority
that an annuity charged on land is extinguished when the annuitant inherits
.the land subject to the annuity. 2 Further, the Pennsylvania court had ancient
authority of its own to the effect that when an annuitant takes an intestate share
in the property subject to the annuity, his share of the estate is relieved of the
annuity, which continues in an amount reduced pro tanto ~ a charge upon the
remainder of the estate.8 Since the legacy here was not set up as a spendthrift
trust, there is no reason to delay payment to the daughter of half the fund which
the court retained to support the annuity. Certainly, if she had so requested, she
should have received immediate payment of her entire share of the estate,
leaving the annuity to run in an amount of $12.50 per month against the
plaintiff's half. It makes little difference whether this be called a result of the
technical doctrine of merger; it is the solution dictated by common sense. The
court's decree in the principal case subjects the daughter to the risk of never
coming into full enjoyment of her inheritance during her lifetime, when
that result is not necessary either to carry out the testator's intent or to protect
the interests of any other person.

L. K. Cooperrider, S.Ed.
1

Principal case at 206.
Cases are collected at 3 C.J., Annuities, § 19. Examples are Jenkins v. Van
Schaak, 3 Paige (N.Y.) 242 (1832); Woods v. Gilson, 178 Mass. 511, 60 N.E. 4,
61 N.E. 58 (1901).
3
Addams v. Heffernan, 9 Watts (Pa.) 529 (1840). The annuity was charged
on land which went to the annuitant's brother. At the death of the brother the
annuitant was one of five Jieirs. The court held the annuity extinguished to the
extent of one-fifth its amount, while the remainder continued a charge on the shares of
the other four heirs. Similar results were reached in Meeker v. Meeker, 137 App.
Div. 537, 121 N.Y.S. 1051 (1910), though the court there did not call it merger.
2

